


Dedicated to
my parents

ROLAND H. WORTH, SR.
RUTH E. WORTH

for all their love and kindnesses
through these many, many years



This book was purchased
through donations to the
***Campaign for Excellence
for the "new" Arlington
Central Library.***

The renovated and expanded
Central Library was dedicated
Dec. 12, 1992

PEARL HARBOR

*Selected Testimonies, Fully Indexed,
from the Congressional Hearings
(1945-1946) and Prior Investigations of
the Events Leading Up to the Attack*

by ROLAND H. WORTH, JR.

CENTRAL LIBRARY
1015 North Quincy St.
Arlington, Va. 22201



McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers
Jefferson, North Carolina, and London

INTRODUCTION

In spite of the various fine works that have been produced concerning the Pearl Harbor assault, the most basic resource document is rarely available and has long been out of print. What can justly be described as the mother lode of data was published in 1946 by the United States Congress under the title *Pearl Harbor Attack*. Because of deep suspicions and bitter accusations about the events leading up to the attack, a joint committee of the House and Senate was appointed and held public hearings during late 1945 and early 1946. The committee members and staff were able to investigate more fully aspects of the controversy that wartime security considerations had made especially sensitive. The committee's 39 lengthy published volumes not only contributed new insights into what had happened, but also reprinted all the prior official investigations (and concluding reports) in unexpurgated form.

No one, unless he or she is determined to become an authority on the event, is likely to take the time to wade through these many thousands of pages. The sheer mass of data discourages even the interested nonspecialist. Nor is the published form "reader friendly": there is no real index and no way to quickly compare testimony on one aspect of the air raid as given by different persons.

Even if one is willing to overlook such inconveniences, the scarcity of the work provides a further discouragement. In most cases it can only be obtained via the sometimes ponderous workings of the interlibrary loan system. Indeed, in one state the editor of this volume used to work in, it would not even have been available from that source because only works currently in print could be obtained, an approach that defeats much of the purpose of having such a system.

For those not wishing to become experts, such difficulties pose yet additional obstacles: If one has the time (or desire) to read only a limited amount of this information, what does one select? Where would one begin? (And end?) Yet it is important to have at least a modest acquaintance with the contents of the key testimony if one is ever adequately to understand the greatest twentieth century military humiliation suffered by the United States. How does one find a way out of this dilemma?

This book attempts to provide a partial solution: It brings together within the confines of one moderately long work a cross-section of the most relevant and interesting testimony. In doing so, it does not overlook the interests of the more advanced student. The printed page numbers of the original volumes have been inserted into the text, and ellipses clearly note where wording has been omitted.

The central problem in compiling such a study as this one is not the lack of good material but in fact its abundance, and the need to prune it to a usable length. The challenge was further intensified by the fact that the majority of those who testified did so before two or three or more investigative bodies. In each case, an attempt has been made to choose the "best" and "most revealing" examples, though sometimes others come in close behind and would be worthy of inclusion if this compendium were substantially longer.

By treating the testimony under key subject headings, the invaluable hard core has been retained while thousands of pages of digression, repetition, and less relevant material have been removed. No effort has been made to limit any speaker's testimony only to that immediately relevant to the theme being discussed. Hence there are places where the speakers wander to other matters of interest which, if isolated under a separate heading, would either lose their context or be inadequately long to justify inclusion.

Upon occasion readers will find an apparent contradiction between the speakers. Such is inevitable in dealing with historical data. Sometimes the difference can be resolved; other times it comes down to whose testimony seems more candid, realistic, and rational. These were men who lived through an extraordinarily traumatic experience, and the inevitable meditation over what "might have been" (and, in some cases, perhaps "should have been") surely must have affected how they shaped and shaded their recollections.

The styles found in this volume differ according to which of the various investigations is being cited. For example, if an investigation numbered the questions asked, the numbering is retained. If it capitalized certain entire words, the capitalization has been retained. If the speaker is not identified each time he speaks, the editor has allowed the initial identification at the head of each extract to suffice. Those cases in which speakers' names are printed in different ways in different investigations have, however, been altered to a uniform style.

In a very real sense, these extracts speak for themselves and require little in the way of interpretive introduction. A brief summary at this point may nevertheless help the reader grasp the central thrust of each of the interrogations.

Section One. The Final Steps to War

Americans remember all too well December 7, 1941. What they less often recall are the events that preceded it, especially when viewed from the perspective of contemporary government officials. To provide this context is the purpose of Section One.

In "Countdown to Conflict: The View from the War Department," Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson recounts various high level meetings held within the executive branch of the government during the final prewar period. Secretary of State Cordell Hull's testimony has been given the title "November 1941: The Intragovernmental Discussion of the War Danger." He makes plain

that in the final weeks and months the highest level of government was speaking of a Pacific War in terms of "when" and not "whether." He concisely sums up his underlying attitudes in the negotiations with the Japanese.

United States Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew addresses the question "Was the American Note of November 26 an Ultimatum?" The Japanese so viewed it, just as the American officials viewed the Japanese note of six days earlier in the same light. One congressman leaned heavily on the ambassador to force him to admit the accuracy of the label. Interestingly, he does so not as a means of putting the two sets of proposals on a moral par but because the congressman believed the Japanese fully deserved an ultimatum.

Section Two. Espionage

Assuming that a modern nation has the capacity to penetrate a potential enemy's secrets, there has seemingly been an irresistible temptation to do so even if no current state of war exists. Such a policy can either be the fact-gathering forerunner of naked aggression or (at least primarily) a defensive tool to protect against becoming the victim of such aggression. Either way, powerful nations of the modern era have always assumed there is a need for such foreign information and acted accordingly.

Brigadier General Sherman Miles, acting chief of staff (intelligence), introduces this theme with his discussion of "The Failure of American Espionage in Japan and Her Possessions." American manpower was very limited, and what modest information could be obtained came from personal observation rather than the utilization of native agents. Ambassador Grew discusses "The Effective Security Screen in Japan Itself." So cautious were the Japanese that American travelers would find the train curtains pulled down when passing military installations.

The ambassador also discusses "An Idle Tale That Later Became Reality: The January 1941 Tokyo Rumor of an Attack on Pearl Harbor." The Peruvian embassy passed along the story to the Americans, but no evidence was uncovered at the time to consider it any more than one of the many unsubstantiated rumors that come the way of any diplomatic official working in a hostile environment. In retrospect we can view this as, at the most, a possible security leak at the time the Japanese began their contingency plans for such an operation. The accusation, on the other hand, may have been a mere lucky guess; the United States was an obvious target for a future war and the base at Pearl Harbor sufficiently vital that some kind of raid upon it was a logical possibility.

Colonel George W. Bicknell, assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department, discusses "The Ease of Japanese Intelligence Gathering in Hawaii." In contrast to the closed society Japan represented to the outsider, much of the useful information about military activities in Hawaii was easily obtainable. Furthermore, there was no large European community in Japan with the potential to be

exploited for intelligence gathering, while the large size of the Japanese population in Hawaii made it likely that at least a modest number could be compromised.

In "Navy/FBI Hostility over Rival Hawaiian Wiretaps," the existence of such interceptions, their contents, and how they resulted in intense bad feelings between the Navy and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are examined. Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen (who had previously served upon the Army Pearl Harbor Board) sums up what happened and how he uncovered the existence of this previously hidden fact.

Section Three. Radar: The Great Missed Opportunity

In the strict sense, the "sneak" aspect of the assault failed to occur: Radar detected the incoming planes but through a combination of errors (new equipment, inexperienced officers, and a new command structure) this opportunity for response was missed. How this happened is the theme of this section.

William E. G. Taylor, a Navy adviser to the Interceptor Command at Pearl Harbor, discusses "Prior American and British Development of Radar." With a background in British radar as well as American land and naval equivalents, he was in a position to provide a professional evaluation of the training being provided and the quality of equipment currently available.

Robert J. Fleming, Jr., an Army supervisory officer for the planning and erection of the necessary facilities, provides a discussion of "The Problem-Laden Construction of the Hawaiian Radar System." In addition to the expected difficulties posed in erecting stations for a little known technology, what a later generation would call "environmental objections" had to be overcome as well.

George E. Elliott, Jr., a trainee on the new radar system, provides a firsthand account of "The Sighting of the Japanese Planes." Working past the end of their normal shift, Elliott and his supervisor were startled by the radar indication of a large number of incoming planes. Their report was passed on to Kermit Tyler, a young officer who momentarily found himself in charge of the recently established aircraft information center. In "The Handling of the Sighting by an Untrained Supervisor," Tyler explains both his lack of training and the reasons he dismissed the sighting.

Section Four. American Penetration of the Japanese Diplomatic Codes

The chief of the Far Eastern section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Arthur H. McCollum, provides a useful description of "The Origin and Work of 'Magic,'" the nickname that became the ongoing designation for the successful

American deciphering of the Japanese diplomatic codes. Also targeted were the Japanese military ciphers, although success on that front was far more limited and temporary. ("Codes" and "ciphers" are of course distinct methods of secret communication but are nonetheless commonly employed as synonyms.)

Lieutenant Commander Alwin D. Kramer would normally have been functioning in the Far Eastern section of the Office of Naval Intelligence. Because of his foreign language skill, he had been "loaned" to the translation section of the Communications Division of the Navy to assist in its "Magic" project. In "Work Patterns in 'Magic,'" he emphasizes how the endeavor functioned as an organization: the division of the work load, the responsibility of each type of participant, and even the official hours of operation.

Commander Laurence F. Safford, chief of the Security Section, Communications Division, United States Navy, offers a brief on "The Normal Distribution Pattern for 'Magic.'" He discusses this theme of who received the intercepts within the context of emphasizing the handling of the final, 14-point Japanese diplomatic message. He also notes the differing interception and deciphering capacities of the various sites connected with this Joint Army-Navy operation.

In retrospect, it is hard for an American not to take pride in the difficult ongoing effort that broke the Japanese diplomatic cipher—and kept it broken. In Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall's testimony on "'Magic': An Exercise in Illegality!" we discover the startling fact that this vitally important success was obtained only at the price of explicitly violating existing American law.

Laurence F. Safford plays the central role in the controversy over whether the United States received definite word that war was going to erupt. The Japanese foreign office had warned its diplomatic offices abroad that in the case of a fatal breach in diplomatic relations with normal means of confidential communication unavailable, certain faked weather forecasts would provide advance warning. According to which phony report was used, one could determine against which nation(s) war would occur; one specific wording would forewarn that conflict with the United States was imminent.

Various possible "winds execute" messages (as these are known) were monitored by intercept stations, but closer attention quickly revealed that each had been misunderstood and was a false alarm. So the question was never whether "false" (erroneous) winds executes had been monitored but whether a real one had been intercepted as well. The significance of Safford's testimony can be summed up in the extract title, "The War Warning 'Winds' Execute: The One Witness Who Persisted in Asserting It Had Been Received."

Because of the intense pressures that went with deciphering, the strain could result in physical or emotional consequences. Since the congressional investigation after the war, there has been repeated speculation that Lieutenant Commander Kramer had been threatened with involuntary (and, implicitly, lengthy) hospitalization if he did not recant his earlier testimony. Since he was already in the hospital and desired to get out at the earliest

possible moment, even implicit pressure of this type could have been quite unsettling. The extract "Was Kramer Pressured to Alter His Testimony That the Winds Message Was Received?" finds Kramer testifying concerning these accusations and reviewing what he had previously testified.

Regardless of the truth concerning the much contested "winds" issue, what information unquestionably was available to American policymakers in the waning hours of peace left no doubt that war was about to erupt. Lester Robert Schulz was present on the night of December 6 and heard the response of "FDR on the Final Prewar Diplomatic Intercept: 'This Means War.'"

"Did the Japanese Suspect Their Codes Were Broken?" Captain Theodore S. Wilkinson, director of Naval Intelligence, introduces this possibility to a clearly startled group of congressional investigators. He points out that the Japanese had little concern over this danger and that the likelihood of it at least occasionally happening was one of the reasons that their ciphers were regularly changed. As to the key diplomatic codes (which were so important to the "Magic" operation), they entertained little or no worry that these had been penetrated at all; these were considered too "secure" to have been breached.

*Section Five. Evaluating the Pearl Harbor Commanders:
Negligent, Malinformed by Their Superiors,
or Just Plain Unlucky?*

That the Japanese were the villains was the unanimous judgment of the American people, but who on the United States' side was responsible for "letting them get away with it"? Since the president was commander-in-chief he was an obvious target for the blame, as were the top men in the Navy and War departments. Except among some long-term Roosevelt foes, the responsibility was, however, quickly assigned to the local commanders at Pearl Harbor itself.

These two officers were Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and U.S. Army Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, commanding general of the Hawaiian Department. At first these two men stoically accepted the public odium and rejection, but as the next few years quickly sped by, both became convinced that they had been unjustly turned into scapegoats and that they had been denied vital information by their superiors in Washington. Kimmel reviews the various communications he had received in the extract "The Impressions, Priorities, and Dangers Implied by the Navy Department in Its Communications with Pearl Harbor." Short covers similar ground in the extract "Did War Department Communications with the Army Commander in Hawaii Imply an Imminent Danger?" At least in retrospect, their superiors insisted that more than adequate warnings had been sent; the two on-the-scene commanders emphatically denied it.

Additional warnings certainly could have been issued by the military bureaucracy in Washington. That these were not sent has resulted in considerable

criticism of the military leadership. The head of the Far East section of the Office of Naval Intelligence drafted an additional cautionary telegram for Admiral Kimmel. "The Rejected Proposal for an Additional Warning to Kimmel" explains why he proposed it and how it came to be rejected by his superiors.

When it became amply clear on the morning of December 7 that war was going to explode in the Pacific, General Marshall felt the need to send a last-minute telegram warning the Army command at Pearl Harbor of the grave danger. Because of a breakdown in communications, this was not received until after the attack. In "The Scrambler Phone Controversy," the testimony is presented of four individuals who deal with different aspects of the perplexing question of why Marshall did not cut out all of the delay (and red tape) by utilizing the scrambler phone that was available to him.

Another fault that has been attributed to Washington officialdom has been in regard to the "Shortages of Military Equipment." This involved a number of different types of hardware but had an especially negative repercussion in regard to the aerial reconnaissance that could have provided Pearl Harbor with an advance alert of the approach of attacking carriers. Without an adequate supply of planes of the right type, it was a practical impossibility to mount the kind of ongoing surveillance that would have been desirable. (This does not, however, answer the question of whether the local commanders best utilized what they did have.)

At this point, the emphasis shifts to alleged inadequacies and misjudgments that were within the ability of the local commanders to rectify. Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short insisted that the two services worked together in an efficient and able manner prior to the attack. However, a far less complimentary picture is visible to the alert reader who carefully examines Admiral Kimmel's testimony, which the editor has titled "Army-Navy Cooperation at Pearl Harbor—and Its (Severe) Limits." A dangerous breakdown in communication clearly existed between the two commanders; neither was fully aware of what his opposite number was doing, and an effective structure for interservice cooperation was clearly lacking.

"War Drills Preparing for Conflict" provides the testimony of the general directly in charge of assuring the readiness of Army anti-aircraft forces against surprise attack. Although the effort was made to thoroughly train these units, Major General Henry T. Burgin brings out the difficulties imposed by a peacetime environment and the bureaucratic procedures of other elements in the Army itself.

General Short explains "Why Military Aircraft Were Not Dispersed on the Ground," the reason being the general fear of sabotage assaults rather than aerial ones. "The Lack of Sabotage at Pearl Harbor" is spelled out in a February 1942 memorandum from the Fourteenth Naval District intelligence officer, I. H. Mayfield. Even after the event, this *lack* of sabotage seemed difficult to explain.

Shortly after the assault, there were widespread tales that alcohol had flown

so freely the night before the attack that huge numbers of American military personnel were incapacitated the following morning, if they were even back on their bases at all. Lieutenant Colonel Melvin L. Craig, the provost marshal of the Hawaiian Department, provides the statistical data that undermine "The Claim of Alcoholic Impairment of U.S. Service Personnel."

Captain William W. Outerbridge, commanding officer of the *Ward*, discusses "Submarine Contacts Just Outside Pearl Harbor on December 7." That morning his vessel attempted to verify an earlier sub sighting and in the process attacked one itself, all shortly before Japanese planes appeared overhead. If this report had worked its way up the chain of command more quickly it is possible that a higher state of alertness would have been ordered, thereby making the Japanese assault that much more difficult.

Finally, "Why Were There No Torpedo Nets in Pearl Harbor?" These basic protective devices could have saved many of the American vessels from being sunk at all. The chief of naval operations traces the continuing evolution of American thought as to whether such precautions were necessary and the decision to ultimately provide such protection for the Hawaiian naval base.

Section Six. Other Pertinent Data

The final section of testimonies in this compendium deals with assorted pieces of information that deserve inclusion but which do not fit into any of the preceding major sections.

Admiral James O. Richardson, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Fleet in 1940, discusses "How the American Fleet Came to Be Permanently Based in Hawaii." He opposed the decision and, in apparent retaliation, was prematurely moved on to a different position.

Somehow Japan moved a massive five-carrier attack fleet halfway across the Pacific without being detected. The chief of the War Plans Division of the Navy, Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, elaborates on the "Wisdom of the Sea Route Chosen by the Japanese" and how it was possible for them to accomplish their audacious plan without being detected.

"The Timing of the Japanese Attacks in the Pacific," provides a chart of when the initial assaults occurred. The times are provided in local, Greenwich, and Washington time.

The director of Naval Intelligence ponders "The Effect of the Pearl Harbor Losses on the Course of the War." It was commonly believed that it made the Pacific War longer, but this testimony brings out the fact that even with far fewer naval vessels than desirable, the United States was still able to inflict serious reversals upon the Japanese navy during the following year.

The final extract deals with what would have been the Pacific strategy of the United States if the surprise attack had not occurred. In "Rainbow 5: The

Role of the Pacific Fleet," Admiral Turner explains the war-fighting strategy the United States had planned to adopt.

Section Seven. The Index

Although section seven is, technically, an index to the volume, in all fairness it might better be described as a "reader's guide." In it an individual can find the major themes, a multitude of minor details, and an incredible number of individuals and locations that could easily be missed in a casual reading of the text. One may use this section as a starting point to determine which parts of the text to read first or one may scan it afterwards to find which details of interest may have been missed in the initial reading.

With the information provided in this volume one is ready to tackle the multitude of theories and counter-theories, assertions and denials, that surround the subject of the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack. It will not provide all the answers but it will provide a sound foundation with which to begin one's study. And it will provide an abundance of information that tends to get lost in all the controversies concerning the responsibility for the success of the assault.

If this were a multivolume work, additional testimony would be introduced on the themes in sections one through six. Yet these additions would essentially constitute supplementary evidence. Useful and even desirable as a more exhaustive treatment would be, what is found here is still an enlightening introduction to one of the most bitterly controversial events in American history. It does not provide all the answers, but it does provide the necessary factual foundation with which one can begin to seek out the answers.

NOTE: Only the most minor of corrections have been made to the original *Pearl Harbor Attack* volumes. Oddities that remain (such as an occasional paragraph that begins with no paragraph indentation and without capitalization) simply reflect the way the material originally appeared.