Dynamics of International Relations
Excerpt from Dynamics of International Relations
, by Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, 1956.
, by Ernst B. Haas (U. of California [Berkeley])
and Allen S. Whiting (Michigan State U.), ©1956 the McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New York.
The Sharpening of Conflict
. In both Europe and Asia, Soviet tactics successfully
freed the hands of Germany and Japan so as to precipitate war between
them and other capitalist powers, simultaneously safeguarding the Soviet center and permitting extension of Russian
power. Concise statement of these tactics came in secret telegrams explaining policy
to the Soviet ambassador to Japan in 1940.28
Moscow explained its acceptance
of Japanese conciliatory moves along the Manchurian border:
...Japan plans intensifying pressure on foreign interests in China and
Southeast Asia by securing the safety of Manchuria. We considered
that this action on part of Japan would collide with foreign nations
to advantage of the Soviet Union and China. We may alleviate our
pressure upon North Manchuria border if Japan lifts her pressure
upon Soviet Russia and China...
A second wire clarified this policy:
...An overall agreement with Japan including peace between Japan and
China would spoil Soviet-American relations. Considering a probable
Soviet-German dispute in the future, we do not desire the cooling of
friendly relations with America. Also such overall agreement with
Japan might destroy our work proceeding among the suppressed peoples
of Asia, and it would, on the one hand, guarantee Japan's free activities
in China and in the Pacific, and on the other, it would not instigate
the Japanese-American war which we desire. So we are planning
not to develop the negotiation into an agreement but merely to alleviate
tension between Japan and the Soviet Union. We concluded an
"Agreement with Germany" because a war is required in Europe...
28These telegrams were intercepted by the Imperial Japanese Government's consul general in
Harbin. Japanese copies were examined by A.S. Whiting and accepted as authentic.
See also Wohlstetter
Armed Truce, The Beginnings of the Cold War 1945-46
Excerpt from Armed Truce, The Beginnings of the Cold War 1945-46
, by Hugh Thomas, 1986.
, by Hugh Thomas,
© 1986 Hugh Thomas, Sceptre edition 1988, Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., London.
Still, occasional intercepted telegrams between the Soviet commissariat for foreign
affairs and embassies abroad which have become available suggest that the
former at least never allowed sentiment to prevent candour. Thus a telegram from
Molotov to Tokyo in 1940 spoke of the "Japanese-American war, which we desire";
and blandly commented 'a war is required in Europe'. 81
81 Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, Dynamics of International Relations (New York 1956),
326. These telegrams were intercepted by the Japanese Government's consul in Harbin, 'we
concluded an Agreement with Germany because a war is required in Europe', the telegram concludes.
On the Hamish Hamilton, London, edition of 1986 the items above are respectively at pp. 66 and 581.
The same goes for the Atheneum, New York, edition of 1987.
Praise for Armed Truce:
"A profoundly brilliant and illuminating book. When you read it, the world begins at last to make sense, and its pieces to fall into place."
"Armed Truce is a brilliantly incisive analysis, vivid in portraiture, always informative, always readable - a distinguished historian's masterful account
of the beginnings of the Cold War."
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
"A splendid overview of the origins and surfacing of the Cold War."